Claver-Carone, U.S. Special Envoy for Latin America: “I’m returning to the private sector and maintain an excellent relationship with President Trump and Secretary Rubio.”
Days before concluding his term in a key position at the State Department, Mauricio Claver-Carone gave an exclusive interview to Infobae in which he analyzed the White House’s ties with Mexico, Venezuela, El Salvador, and Argentina.
(From Washington, United States) Punctual and elegant, Mauricio Claver-Carone awaits Infobae in the lobby of a relaxed hotel in Georgetown. Donald Trump’s special envoy for Latin America completes his term at the end of the month—130 days under current legislation—and has decided to return to private activity despite his influence and power in the regional agenda of the White House and the State Department.
Claver-Carone was not removed as special envoy. He made a personal decision and will maintain contact with Trump and Secretary of State Marco Rubio.
“I’ve always had a good relationship with the President, and that will continue. And Marco Rubio and I have been friends for twenty years, and I speak with him three, four, or five times a day. There’s no political issue here; I decided to return to private activity to focus on my private fund,” said Claver Carone.
The special envoy for Latin America, whose term ends on May 29, reviewed his tenure during an exclusive interview with Infobae.
Claver-Carone described his security and immigration policy design with respect to Mexico, analyzed the political relationship between Trump and Nayib Bukele , president of El Salvador, proposed a working hypothesis for strengthening the OAS, and criticized the swap Argentina renewed with China.
Below is the full report :
– Why are you leaving your position as Donald Trump’s special envoy for Latin America?
When President Trump won, I was offered several positions to enter the government full-time. I had created a new investment fund 18 months earlier, and I had commitments to my investors. So, they offered me a part-time position, which meant a maximum of 130 days of work so I could focus on helping and supporting the President and the Secretary of State. Together with Marco Rubio, who has been one of my best friends for decades, we created the architecture of the President’s foreign policy for Latin America and the Caribbean.
– So you’re leaving for a personal reason, and there’s no political reason?
– No. It was always my commitment to stay for 130 days to help create the architecture of the President’s foreign policy in the region.
– Aren’t you leaving because of internal differences with President Trump or Secretary Rubio?
– Quite the opposite, the opposite . I’ve always had a good relationship with the president, and that continues. And with Secretary of State Marco Rubio, we’ve been friends for 20 years now. We’ve known each other from other lives, and we talk three, four, or five times a day. I’m not at odds with Trump or Rubio. And I work 24/7 as a volunteer
-Didn’t he get paid for his work?
– Not a penny. They didn’t compensate me for a trip, nothing. I paid for everything out of my own pocket.
– When you tell me that you helped design the administrative architecture for Latin America, what does that mean?
– We had to focus on the President’s priorities. And what I focused on most during the transition, and then starting on January 20th, was border security. That was President Trump’s priority.
-What does that mean?
Mexico. The first thing I worked on from the transition to taking office was Mexico. The president won based on creating border security, and for that, the relationship with Mexico was obviously going to be essential. And I’m proud of what we’ve been able to achieve in cooperation, working with President Claudia Sheinbaum . I don’t think anyone expected to have such a cordial and cooperative relationship with President Trump.
-Under the undocumented immigration that entered through the southern border of the United States?
President Sheinbaum has clearly surpassed the support we have received from President (Andrés Manuel) López Obrador , and the result is very clear: this is the most secure border we’ve had in the last 20 years.
– Was the United States’ bilateral relationship with El Salvador , and the decision to send alleged terrorists linked to the Maras and El Tren de Aragua , also part of the foreign policy architecture you designed with Rubio?
– Yes. And it was an agreement that the Secretary of State reached on his trip to El Salvador. In this context, as part of that architecture, it was the Secretary of State’s first trip to certain Central American countries: Panama, Guatemala, El Salvador, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic . And that’s where the agreement between the Secretary of State and President Bukele was finalized, which has been historic.
-From this perspective, who is the Republican administration’s ally among Latin American countries?
-We have great allies with President (Rodrigo) Chávez in Costa Rica, President (Luis) Abinader in the Dominican Republic, President (Javier) Milei in Argentina , President Santiago Peña in Paraguay, and now with the victory of Daniel Noboa in Ecuador.
-Now that he’s leaving, is Venezuela left as an unfinished business?
– With Venezuela, in the first four months, the most important thing we had to achieve, and I think we’ve achieved it, is to recreate leverage.
-In this case, what does leverage mean?
– The Biden administration had a complete policy of surrender. It handed Venezuela over to drug traffickers, to criminals like Alex Saab . And nothing changed. Biden allowed millions of gang members to enter the United States to terrorize, and outsourced foreign policy in Latin America.
-Did he outsource..?
-Yes. He outsourced it to (Gustavo) Petro in Colombia and to Lula (Da Silva) in Brazil. All serious mistakes that, frankly, strengthened the Maduro regime.
-And what did you do?
We’ve been able to reestablish credibility, seriousness, and recreate leverage. I have two examples: we sent the criminals and terrorist gang members from the Aragua Train to El Salvador. And the hostages who were sheltered in the Argentine embassy in Caracas were rescued . There’s already a dual policy of pressure and diplomacy, which I think is important.
Do you think that with this strategy, Maduro will eventually release the ten political prisoners the United States is interested in, plus the Argentine gendarme?
President Bukele has made a very reasonable and interesting proposal to Nicolás Maduro, which he should take seriously .
– For you, should it be symmetrical, a political prisoner for a drug trafficker?
– The Venezuelan terrorists imprisoned at the CECOT (Center for the Confinement of Terrorism) are under the authority and jurisdiction of President Bukele, and that decision will be made by President Bukele.
– Did the possibility of creating a peacekeeping mission within the OAS to resolve the institutional crisis in Haiti factor into your design of Trump’s foreign policy architecture in Latin America?
There’s a lot of skepticism in the United States Congress about the future of the OAS, its functionality, and its importance, so many decades after its creation. So, I believe Haiti represents a unique opportunity to re-establish significant relevance, whether through political leadership or something else.
-What does political leadership mean?
-I don’t want to anticipate the ideas of the future Secretary General of the OAS, (Albert Randim) , but it would be important to lead the efforts of the existing multilateral commission under the UN umbrella, or an OAS peace corps , and it wouldn’t be the first time in its history.
-Sixty years ago in the Dominican Republic…
-So I would welcome any proposal that might come from the OAS for political leadership or anything else on its part. So I think it’s an opportunity. I see the crisis in Haiti, which is something that worries me greatly, as a great opportunity for the OAS to recreate the relevance that many questioned.
– In these nearly 130 days in office, has China’s offensive against Latin America slowed down or deepened?
-I think it’s been easing since the first Trump administration, and we’ve seen it in issues like sovereign lending and the magnitude of investments.
-China advanced in Latin America, why did the United States neglect its sphere of influence?
– China advanced because the region didn’t present American investors with a context that implied value and return. American investors are driven by value and return, while China invests only to build power and influence . That’s the basic difference. And that’s Latin America’s responsibility.
-In this context, are you concerned about the Argentine government’s political decision to renew the freely available swap with China?
– My personal opinion, and I believe the opinion of many of us in the government, is that it could have been paid in advance so that the Fund program would then be clean.
-Cleaner?
-I believe, frankly, that if the Fund program had been paid in advance, it could have been even more robust. But what’s done is done. They renewed the 5 billion, and they have a Fund program that has a great opportunity. I wish President Milei success.
-Is the Chinese swap that Milei’s government extended making noise with the Trump administration?
-Obviously, because it’s going to have to address the issue, right? Because, after all, we were talking earlier about leverage. And the greatest leverage the Chinese government has over Argentina is the swap.
-Would your recommendation be that if reserves in Argentina grow, Javier Milei would have to pay the swap and leave?
-President Milei shouts “Long Live Freedom, Damn It!” Right? I think he wants Argentina to be free, right?
-That’s what it says…
-As long as the country has the swap, it’s tied to China and depends on that swap to sustain itself economically. Therefore, Argentina isn’t free.
